Information Ethics Group

Research Reports

2005

IEG-RR-7 [.pdf]

A Defence of Informational Structural Realism
L. Floridi, September 2005, pp 49.

The paper defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not all relata (structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome is informational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. In the second half of the paper, ten objections are answered in order to clarify further the nature of the proposal.

IEG-RR-6 [.pdf]

Solving the Symbol Grounding Problem: a Critical Review of Fifteen Years of Research
M. Taddeo and L. Floridi, May 2005, pp 38.

This article reviews eight proposed strategies for solving the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP), which was given its classic formulation in Harnad (1990). After a concise introduction, we provide an analysis of the requirement that must be satisfied by any hypothesis seeking to solve the SGP, the zero semantical commitment condition. We then use it to assess the eight strategies, which are organised into three main approaches: representationalism, semi-representationalism and non-representationalism. The conclusion is that all the strategies are semantically committed and hence that none of them provides a valid solution to the SGP, which remains an open problem.

2004

IEG-RR-5 [.pdf]

How To Do Philosophy Informationally
G. M. Greco, G. Paronitti, M. Turilli and L. Floridi, November 2004, 10 pp.

In this paper we introduce three methods to approach philosophical problems informationally: Minimalism, the Method of Abstraction and Constructionism. Minimalism considers the specifications of the starting problems and systems that are tractable for a philosophical analysis. The Method of Abstraction describes the process of making explicit the level of abstraction at which a system is observed and investigated. Constructionism provides a series of principles that the investigation of the problem must fulfil once it has been fully characterised by the previous two methods. For each method, we also provide an application: the problem of visual perception, functionalism, and the Turing Test, respectively.

IEG-RR-4 [.pdf]

Levellism and the Method of Abstraction
L. Floridi and J. W. Sanders, November 2004, 41pp

The use of "levels of abstraction" in philosophical analysis (levellism) has recently come under attack. In this paper, we argue that a refined version of epistemological levellism should be retained as a fundamental method, which we call the method of abstraction. After a brief introduction, in section two we make clear the nature and applicability of the (epistemological) method of levels of abstraction. In section three, we show the fruitfulness of the new method by applying it to five case studies: the concept of agenthood, the Turing test, the definition of emergence, quantum observation and decidable observation. In section four, we further characterise and support the method by distinguishing it from three other forms of "levellism": (i) levels of organisation; (ii) levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual schemes. In this context, we also briefly address the problems of relativism and antirealism. In the conclusion, we indicate some of the work that lies ahead, two potential limitations of the method and some results that have already been obtained by applying the method to some long-standing philosophical problems.

2003

IEG-RR-3 [.pdf]

Informational Realism
L. Floridi, October 2003, 15pp

What is the ultimate nature of reality? This paper defends an answer in terms of informational realism (IR). It does so in three stages. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable by using the methodology of the levels of abstractions. It follows that OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that OSR is also plausible, because not all related objects are logically prior to all relational structures. The relation of difference is more fundamental (because constitutive of) any relata. Third, it is suggested that an ontology of structural objects for OSR can reasonably be developed in terms of informational objects, and that Object Oriented Programming provides a flexible and powerful methodology with which to clarify and make precise the concept of "informational object". The outcome is informational realism, the view that the world is the totality of informational objects (structured constraining affordances) dynamically interacting with each other.

IEG-RR-2 [.pdf] [.ps]

The Tragedy of the Digital Commons
G.M. Greco and L. Floridi, October 2003, 26pp

In the paper it is argued that bridging the digital divide may cause a new ethical and social dilemma. Using Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, we show that an improper opening and enlargement of the digital environment (Infosphere) is likely to produce a Tragedy of the Digital Commons (TDC). In the course of the analysis, we explain why Adar and Huberman's previous use of Hardin's Tragedy to interpret certain recent phenomena in the Infosphere (especially peer-to-peer communication) may not be entirely satisfactory. We then seek to provide an improved version of the TDC that avoids the possible shortcomings of Adar and Huberman's model. Next, we analyse some problems encountered by the application of classical ethics in the resolution of the TDC. In the conclusion, we outline the kind of work that will be required to develop an ethical approach that may avoid the TDC.

IEG-RR-1 [.pdf] [.ps]

Internet Ethics: the Constructionist Values of Homo Poieticus
L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders, February 2003, 28pp

In this report, we argue that the web is a poietically-enabling environment, which both enhances and requires the development of a "constructionist ethics". We begin by explaining the appropriate concept of "constructionist ethics", and analysing virtue ethics as the primary example. We then show why CyberEthics (or Computer Ethics, as it is also called) cannot be based on virtue ethics, yet needs to retain a constructionist approach. After providing evidence for significant poietic uses of the web, we argue that ethical constructionism is not only facilitated by the web, but is also what the web requires as an ethics of the digital environment. In conclusion, we relate the present discussion to standard positions in CyberEthics and to a broader project for Information Ethics.