# PRISM-games 3.0

## Stochastic Game Verification

with

## Concurrency, Equilibria and Time











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## Stochastic Game Verification

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University of Glasgow

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ERC Advanced Grant FUN2MODEL

# Stochastic Games

- Stochastic games:
  - nondeterminism: adversarial, controllers, …
  - probability: randomisation, failures, noise, …
  - players: competing/collaborating components
  - strategies: rational decisions made by players
  - costs (resources) & rewards (incentives)







- Applications:
  - computer security, network/communication protocols, algorithms for distributed consensus, energy management, autonomous robotics, auctions, …

- Challenge:
  - how to design these systems correctly?
  - complex interactions between features

# PRISM-games

- PRISM-games
  - modelling and analysis of stochastic games
  - automated verification or synthesis of strategies with quantitative guarantees

- Example specification in rPATL
  - $\langle\langle \text{robot}_1 \rangle\rangle\, P_{\geq 0.95}\, [\, F^{\leq 10}\, \text{goal}_1\, ]$
  - "robot 1 has a strategy to ensure that, with probability at least 0.95, it reaches its goal in 10 steps, regardless of the strategies of other robots"











# Concurrent stochastic games


Turn-based stochastic games (TSGs)

Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs)







- Players make concurrent, independent decisions

# Concurrent stochastic games

Example: Maximising expected investor profit in a futures market




Too pessimistic: unrealistic strategy for adversary

# CSGs in PRISM-games 3.0

```
csg
player p1 user1 endplayer
player p2 user2 endplayer
// Users (senders)
module user1
	s1 : [0..1] init 0; // has player 1 sent?
	e1 : [0..emax] init emax; // energy level of player 1
	[w1] true -> (s1'=0); // wait
	[t1]  e1>0 -> (s1'=c' ? 0 : 1) & (e1'=e1-1); // transmit
endmodule
module user2 = user1 [ s1=s2, e1=e2, w1=w2, t1=t2 ] endmodule
// Channel: used to compute joint probability distribution for transmission failure
module channel
	c : bool init false; // is there a collision?
	[t1,w2] true -> q1 : (c'=false) + (1-q1) : (c'=true); // only user 1 transmits
	[w1,t2] true -> q1 : (c'=false) + (1-q1) : (c'=true); // only user 2 transmits
	[t1,t2]  true -> q2 : (c'=false) + (1-q2) : (c'=true); // both users transmit
endmodule
```

# CSGs in PRISM-games 3.0

```
csg
player p1 user1 endplayer
player p2 user2 endplayer
// Users (senders)
module user1
	s1 : [0..1] init 0; // has player 1 sent?
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	[w1] true -> (s1'=0); // wait
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endmodule
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	[w1,t2] true -> q1 : (c'=false) + (1-q1) : (c'=true); // only user 2 transmits
	[t1,t2]  true -> q2 : (c'=false) + (1-q2) : (c'=true); // both users transmit
endmodule
```

Player = one or more modules

Variable updates can refer to other variables updated simultaneously

Action lists used to specify synchronisation

# Equilibria-based properties


Zero-sum properties

Equilibria-based properties

- Example: multi-robot coordination
  - $\langle\langle \text{robot}_1 \rangle\rangle_{\max=?}\ P\ [\ F^{\leq k}\ \text{goal}_1\ ]$
  - maximise probability of robot 1 reaching its goal, regardless of robot 2



  - $\langle\langle \text{robot}_1\text{:robot}_2 \rangle\rangle_{\max=?}$ $(P\ [\ F^{\leq k}\ \text{goal}_1\ ] + P\ [F^{\leq k}\ \text{goal}_2])$
  - find strategies where robots 1 & 2 have no incentive to change actions and maximise joint goal probability

Social-welfare optimal Nash equilibrium



# PRISM-games 3.0


- Probabilistic timed games (turn-based)


- 10 new/expanded case studies
  - multi-robot coordination, network trust models, Aloha, intrusion detection, public good games, ...

- More information at:
  - prismmodelchecker.org/games/
  - documentation, examples, case studies, papers
  - downloads:  + CAV'20 artefact VM


- Open source (GPLv2)
  - github.com/prismmodelchecker/prism-games