Separating two roles of hashing in one-way message authentication
Long Hoang Nguyen and Andrew William Roscoe
Abstract
We analyse two new and related families of authentication protocols, where a party wants to authenticate its public information to another. In the first, the objective is to do without shared passwords or a PKI, making use of low-bandwidth empirical or authentic channels where messages cannot be faked or modified. The analysis of these leads to a new security principle, termed separation of security concerns, under which protocols should be designed to tackle random and search attacks separately. This also leads us develop a new class of digital signature schemes which is potentially much more efficient than conventional signature schemes.
Details
| Book Title |
FCS-ARSPA-WITS'08 |
| Journal |
In proceedings of FCS-ARSPA-WITS'08 workshop |
| Year |
2008, In Proceedings of FCS-ARSPA-WITS'08 workshop (Foundation of Computer Security, Automated Reasoning Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security) |
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